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Abstract
SENSITIVITY OF STATE AID ALLOCATION TO MEASURES
OF NEEDS AND RESOURCES IN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
by Adam D. Baus

This analysis examines the sensitivity of state intergovernmental aid, per capita, to
measures of resources, infrastructure, social services, social problems and demographics in
Northern and Southern local governments in 1982 and 1992. Time-periods chosen are
based on the potential for domestic policies born through new federalism to harm local
governments through lesser amounts of available state aid. North and South are compared
to account for possible regional differences. Regardless of region and time however,
redistribution efforts to local governments with higher levels of need and lower levels of
resources are not particularly good. Redistribution tendencies present in 1982 declined by
1992 in both the North and South. Southern local governments in 1982 and 1992 did not
show more willingness, or ability, to target state aid to areas with high need and low
resources. Redistribution efforts being weak in both the North and South contradicts the
frostbelt/sunbelt distinction.
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this research is to examine the sensitivity of state intergovernmental
aid to levels of needs and resources within local governments. To what extent are state aid
figures, per capita, positively correlated with percent of individuals living in older housing,
percent receiving SSI and Social Security, crime rate, percent below poverty and percent
unemployed? Conversely, to what extent are state aid figures, per capita, redistributional in
character? In other words, to what extent is state aid per capita negatively correlated with
property value, total tax per capita and percent with a college degree or more? New
federalism highlights possible regional differences, or frostbelt/sunbelt distinctions, in
allocation (Cole and Delbert 1983). This study therefore examines the potential for both
time-period and regional differences in sensitivity to needs and resources by comparing per
capita state intergovernmental aid in 1982 and 1992 within Northern and Southern states.
The year 1982 pre-dates many changes in domestic policy, while 1992 is after the fact.
This analysis is not intended to argue that per capita intergovernmental aid from
states should be positively related with every measure of need, or that state aid per capita
should be negatively associated with all measures of resources. In other words, taking into
account the numerous programs and services funded through state intergovernmental aid, it
is not expected that state aid per capita will be consistently redistributed to local
governments with greater signs of socioeconomic hardship.

The review of literature

demonstrates that this is not the case. Instead, this analysis is intended to examine the
relationship of state aid per capita to measures of resources, infrastructure, social services,
social problems and demographics in Northern and Southern local governments in 1982
and 1992. In effect, the extent to which state aid per capita is sensitive to local government
needs and resources is under examination.

1

CHAPTER 1: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AID

1. Statement of the Problem
How sensitive is state intergovernmental aid, on a per capita basis, to levels of
needs and resources within local governments. To what extent are state aid figures, per
capita, positively correlated with measures of need? Conversely, to what extent are state
aid figures, per capita, redistributional in character? In other words, to what extent are
state aid figures per capita negatively correlated with measures of available resources?
In effect, this study questions the methods, or decision-making systems, states use when
distributing aid to local governments.
circumstances surrounding it.

The significance of this analysis lies in the

Research on determinants of aid allocation suggests

numerous factors comprising the socioeconomic status, or overall well being, of an area
may go overlooked when allocating state aid to local governments (Merget 1981,
Copeland and Meier 1984, Ebel 1991, Stein and Hamm 1994). If redistribution efforts to
local governments with higher levels of need and lower levels of resources are not
particularly strong, then areas most in need of aid remain disadvantaged.
2. Quality of Life
The overall quality of life within communities, an issue surrounding social policy,
is an essential consideration faced by local government officials and citizens alike. Local
governments are constantly challenged to maintain adequate levels of economic growth,
fiscal health and public service delivery, while sustaining a sound quality of life within
their areas. Czerwinski (2000) writes that even though problem areas can be categorized in
basically the same manner, each community faces somewhat unique challenges.
Surrounding this problem, however, is the tendency for some local officials to measure
community health simply through tax receipts, the value of property and the strength of
payroll.

Flower (1997) notes that doing so overlooks the quality of life within a

community and the degree to which residents are healthy and satisfied.
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Reeder (1996) writes that federal block grants were designed to aid socioeconomic
needs of needy areas. The increased need for social services and the declining job market,
low incomes, lacking tax bases, poor financial management, declining populations,
geographic isolation and overall poor demographic characteristics of some localities
brought increased attention in the form of intergovernmental aid. Hasler (1986), Feder and
Hadley (1986) and Schneider and Logan (1986) all note targeting aid began with the idea
that the allocation of greater and more targeted resources to localities in need can have a
beneficial effect on those residents in need. If methods of aid allocation, and determinants
used within them, do not account for such factors, local governments in need may become
further damaged.
3. Declining Aid and Issues of Aid Allocation
The situation of declining aid may provide important context to the measures able
to be tested in this study. The rationale behind this consideration stems partly from the
research of Merget (1981) and Ebel (1991) on determinants and methods of aid allocation
to local governments. Overall, these authors suggest numerous factors comprising the
socioeconomic status, or overall well-being, of an area are overlooked when deciding how
to allocate aid. In the process, those areas experiencing more severe degrees of need
continue to lack needed aid, resources and attention. At the same time however, aid that is
being allocated to local governments is declining. In other words, while there may be a
lack of effective targeting to those areas with the greatest degree of need, there is also a
decreasing amount of available aid to local governments.
Additionally, Johnson (1985) lends support to the idea that aid allocation becomes
better informed when taking into account issues of declining aid. Johnson’s analysis aimed
to measure local government dependence during 1976 to1977 through use of four
measures: federal and state aid as a percentage of total local revenue, federal aid as a
percentage of total local revenue, federal and state intergovernmental revenues per capita,
and federal-only intergovernmental revenues per capita. All four measures of dependence
were negatively correlated with high growth and high income. In effect, low growth and
low-income areas were more dependent on intergovernmental revenues for their needs.
3

The underlying point, then, is large scale cuts in aid have the potential to harm localities
dependent on social services, and those experiencing economic and population declines.
At the same time however, Merget (1981), Copeland and Meier (1984), Ebel (1991) and
Stein and Hamm (1994) note that population tends to be a prime determinant in aid
allocation to local governments. This conflicts with the idea that areas with low growth
and declining populations are more dependent on intergovernmental revenues.
4. Issues Informing Intergovernmental Aid Allocation
Due to the limitations of this study, certain issues that inform intergovernmental aid
allocation will not be measured. These considerations may be best dealt with through a
separate analysis. However, new federalism, local government officials’ responses to
declining intergovernmental aid and the post-Reagan administrations may give needed
context to this study.
New federalism.

Federalism is broadly defined as the categorization or

restructuring of numerous federal programs, funded by intergovernmental aid, into a few.
Conlan (1998), Liebschutz and Taddiken (1986) and Nathan and Doolittle (1985) agree
that the new federalism of the Reagan administration was a drive to return many federally
funded responsibilities, especially social service programs, to state and local governments.
The domestic policies within new federalism called for the reduction, or elimination, of
both state and federal funding for many social services and their management, as well as
decreased funding to state and local governments. This policy direction resulted in a $35.2
billion reduction in 1981 domestic program spending; a $5 billion reduction in income
security programs; the stiffening of eligibility requirements for Medicaid, food stamps,
AFDC and child nutrition programs; the consolidation of seventy-seven programs into
nine; and the termination of sixty-two programs including the Comprehensive Employment
Training Act (CETA). Plus, seventy seven block grants were consolidated into nine under
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981. This shifted the responsibility of funding
social services from the state to the local level.

4

Eliminating inefficiencies within the federal government, then, meant having to end
numerous federal programs to state and local governments. Conlan (1998) writes that
goals of the Reagan administration tended to conflict with those of needy, dependent
groups and the ability of federal aid to reach those most in need through domestic policies.
Cole, Taebel and Hissong (1990) note the most documented consequence of new
federalism, specifically within cities, is the reduction of federal aid from 13.6 percent of
total revenue in 1980 to 8 percent in 1986. Regardless of region, size or economic
condition, cities in general began to receive significantly smaller proportions of federal aid
than in 1980.
Responses to cuts in aid. Second, the responses of local government officials to
cuts in intergovernmental aid may prove insightful to the allocation process. Morgan and
Hirlinger (1993) note this may prove especially important due to the lack of research in
assessing the impacts of decreases in intergovernmental aid on the most dependent
locations, and the ways in which these areas have responded to reductions.
Cole and Taebel (1984) note it was widely assumed local officials would be
forced to compensate for the loss of federal and state funds by reducing or removing
public services, laying off local employees, raising taxes or relying more on user fees and
charges. Service operating grants and employment programs, which tend to be viewed
by local officials as the easiest to cut, experienced some of the greatest reductions in aid.
The removal of public service employment programs accounted for about half of grant
reductions. Nathan and Doolittle (1985) note that Aid to Families With Dependent
Children (AFDC), Medicaid and the food stamp program, community action agency and
community development block grants, and health and education block grants experienced
large reductions in funding.
In short, some of the most harmed individuals were the poorest. Replacement
levels for these public services were consistently low (Nathan and Doolittle 1985). Local
officials tended to consider these needs as less of an immediate concern to the overall well
being of localities. Many state and local governments did not feel obligated to continue
funding programs perceived as federal. On the other hand, capital programs such as federal
5

highway, airport and mass transit systems viewed with more political importance received
increases in federal spending during the same time period.
Local governments themselves were not greatly harmed by many of the reductions
in federal aid, nor even those reductions of the 1981-1982 Reagan administration budget.
Peterson (1986) suggests difficult financial conditions were weathered, at least in great
part, due to the detachable nature of many federally assisted programs. Programs most
harmed by federal reductions were consistently those most separate from city functions and
those which did not have much, if any, political influence or support.

Conversely,

wastewater treatment, general revenue sharing and mass transit survived without
reductions. This corresponds with Cole and Taebel (1984), as cited in Peterson (1986),
when finding cuts in aid during the Reagan administration coincide with political attitudes.
Overall, the degree of replacement, or the willingness of state and local
governments to give additional funding to services, reflects the willingness to maintain
government activities. However, Nathan and Doolittle (1984) note the community service
block grant was the only block grant not to receive replacement funding from state
governments. Community service agencies, legal aid, low-income housing assistance and
temporary public employees were targeted for cuts in funding. Reductions in aid tended to
be passed on to individual programs, not the city budgets or the taxpayers. Many social
services, then, tended to be viewed by local officials as only marginal when compared to
other service responsibilities. This claim is reinforced by numerous case studies conducted
by the Urban Institute, as well as by case studies completed by Nathan and Doolittle
(1984), Cole, Taebel and Hissong (1990) and Peterson (1986) on impacts felt by state and
local governments in response to reductions in funding for the social services under the
Reagan administration.

Findings from these studies support the claim that service

populations, or aid recipients, are most harmed by cuts in aid.
The post-Reagan administrations. Third, Conlan (1998) notes that between 1990
and 1994 six significant mandates were formed requiring state and local governments to
contribute billions of dollars. By 1994, these actions, in conjunction with already existing
intergovernmental regulations of the 1960s and 1970s, helped bring federal mandate
6

reform, and the fiscal burdens mandates tend to carry, to the forefront local government
concerns.
Conlan (1998) writes that while President Bush (1989-1993) expressed desire to
channel aid to state and local governments through block grants, the 1991 State of the
Union address stands in contradiction.

The proposal suggested that the community

development block grant, and some social service, low-income energy assistance and
education block grants should, at best, receive reduced funding. While this plan was not
carried out due mainly to anticipated declines in funds, it may nonetheless prove telling in
regards to the nature of aid allocation.
The 104th Congress, falling under the Clinton administration, was also marked with
the desire to decrease aid to the social services. Titled the Contract with America, which
began in 1994, this plan included the consolidation of 349 programs, totaling $217 billion,
into ten block grants. Conlan (1998) and King (1999) note that this pressured social service
programs to compete for scarce federal funds. Some supporters of spending cuts in the
social services responded by stating they did not want to harm citizens or beneficiaries
dependent on government support, but they were compelled by policy to do so. In the end,
however, Congress cut domestic spending by a smaller amount than proposed. While the
early 104th Congress aimed to consolidate over 300 federal programs into eight block
grants, amounting to $125 billion, twelve new block grants were finally passed and 200
small programs and agencies terminated.
Similarly, Beckman (1995) highlights the Personal Responsibility Act (PRA) of
1996 within the Contract with America of the Clinton administration. The rationale of
the PRA is reducing or eliminating financial assistance to the poor will encourage a
greater degree of responsibility. While the first version was rejected, King (1999) and
Posner and Wrightson (1996) cite that the House of Representatives initially approved the
PRA and agreed to cut $66 billion from food and various domestic anti-poverty programs
over five years; translating into an average decrease of $1,700 per person per year for
families below the poverty level (at the time, $15,000 per year). These types of aid are
generally referred to as the social safety net. The final version of the PRA was passed in
August 1996; allowing food stamps to remain an entitlement program without setting an
7

expenditure cap, despite the threats the program came under throughout the 104th
Congress.
King (1999) suggests decisions made surrounding the PRA tended to be based on
short term political factors; not the underlying principles with which it was drafted. Social
services, which tend to have weak political backing, usually experience fiscal defeat. This
is especially true during times marked by competition over scarce federal funding.
However, proponents of block grants cite money saved by restraining available funding for
program spending and reduced federal responsibility are incentives of block grants.
Conversely, opponents of block grants such as Senator John Breaux from Louisiana is
quoted in King (1999, 362) stating:
“Block grants are like taking all the problems that we have with the welfare problem and
putting them in a box, then wrapping it all up, tying a bow around it, and then mailing that
box of problems to the States, saying: Here, it is yours. It is a block grant. It is a block
grant of problems with less money to help solve those problems. That, I think, is not a
solution.”
Again, this analysis will not measure these four issues surrounding, or informing,
aid allocation.

However, the context provided by these issues may have important

implications to measures capable of being tested. In general, research on determinants of
aid allocation suggests numerous factors comprising the socioeconomic status, or overall
well being, of an area may go overlooked when allocating state aid to local governments.
In effect, it is possible that local governments experiencing more severe degrees of need,
specifically in regards to the social services, continue to lack needed aid, resources and
attention.
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CHAPTER 2:REVIEW OF LITERATURE
1. Background of Intergovernmental Aid
Block grants. Posner and Wrightson (1996) note that although the term block grant
was not yet in use, the Hoover Commission in 1949 suggested consolidated grants across
broad social functions and needs would help reduce perceived inefficiencies in
government. Block grants, then, share a common theme in that they are supposed to offer
improved government operations through state involvement rather than federal.
Reeder (1996) adds that federal block grants, officially created in 1966, were
designed to aid socioeconomic needs of disadvantaged areas; especially those needs of the
rural poor. Rural areas were targeted, or given special attention, due to their need for
increased social services, the declining job market, low incomes, lacking tax bases, poor
financial management, declining populations, geographic isolation and overall poor
demographic

characteristics

which

can

severely limit

economic

development.

Intergovernmental aid, then, oftentimes plays a significant role in the quality of life of
many rural areas (Dougherty, Klase and Song 1999, Steven 1995, Henderson 1991, Brown
and Warner 1991, Molnar and Smith 1982).
In general however, Posner and Wrightson (1996) cite the potential for block grants
to harm states and communities. Governors surveyed by these researchers in 1981 and
1995 indicated they would be willing to accept cuts in federal aid and the capping of
federally funded programs in exchange for more state flexibility. Historically however,
cuts in funding tend to remain permanent while increased flexibility becomes reversed
over time. States find themselves in need of dealing with decreased federal aid and
increased requirements that may lead to less efficient, more expensive operations.
Targeting aid. Rich (1993) writes that targeting aid to those areas and citizens
within the United States (U.S.) with the greatest need was a gradual development.
Beginning in the early 1900s, this sentiment evolved in concert with the development of the
grant-in-aid system. Hasler (1986), Feder and Hadley (1986) and Schneider and Logan
(1985) agree that targeting is based on the idea that the allocation of greater resources to
localities in need can have a beneficial effect on those residents in need. This is the driving
9

assumption behind intergovernmental aid allocation, which is to lessen the variances, or
disparities, in the abilities of states and localities to locally generate needed revenues
(Downes and Pogue 1992, Stein and Hamm 1987, Copeland and Meier 1984).
Rich (1993) and Downes and Pogue (1992) agree that one of the most basic issues
of any political system is the degree to which government plays a role in reducing
economic inequalities; including that of equal levels of public services. However, this
equalizing in the form of redistributive aid is not a simple process. Rich (1993) suggests
this is due, at least in great part, to the U.S. system of federalism itself, in which actions
taken by one level of government can potentially shape actions taken by another.
Similarly, Karski and Barth (2000) write that resource allocation is a complicated process;
one which must take into account the aims of the social service program, the target
population, the amount of people in need and the type of work that must be done for the
equal distribution of needed social services.
In all, Rich (1993) notes that there are three dimensions of targeting. These
dimensions are the degree to which federal funds are allocated to the places most in need,
the choices made at the local level on how federal funds are distributed, and the types of
activities given funding.

In short, federal aid passes through three tiers of use: the

allocation of aid to places in need, neighborhoods in need, and finally people in need. In
the process of identifying and discussing these dimensions, Rich emphasizes that too much
attention has been given to decision making at the federal level. In the process, roles
played by state and local governments in shaping aid distribution become overlooked.
Choices made at the local level, then, can have a significant impact on which localities
receive aid, and to what extent aid received is actually beneficial to those in need.
Rich (1993) highlights a point central to this analysis. Namely, different methods
of aid allocation to local governments can influence the types of areas that benefit.
Similarly, Hasler (1986) notes that methods of aid distribution can influence the degree to
which aid received is beneficial for those residents in need. If methods of aid allocation do
not take into account the increased needs for social services, lower incomes and declining
job markets, lacking tax bases, declining populations and overall poor demographic
characteristics some local governments demonstrate, local governments in need may
10

become further damaged. Within the context of these critical issues, determinants of aid
allocation take precedence as a significant issue for needy and dependent localities and
their residents.
2. Previous Research on Intergovernmental Aid
Available literature on the study of intergovernmental aid allocation to local
governments is sparse.

Research is especially lacking considering the fact that aid

allocation is not a new issue, and considering the importance of aid redistribution within
socioeconomically disadvantaged areas. In short, determinants used to allocate funds to
local governments have not been fully researched.
Rich (1993) writes that available literature on determinants of intergovernmental
aid allocation has been conceptually and empirically lacking. Hasler (1986) is one of
only a few studies concentrating on the targeting of aid within local governments, and the
implications allocation formulas have on targeting to the poor. This work gives mention
to an unpublished study, conducted in 1977 at the Urban Institute, titled “The Substate
Allocation Of Title XX Funds.” Hasler (1986, 28) notes that this study found “there were
almost as many procedures for allocating resources as there are states.”

Focusing on

allocation within the local level, Downes and Pogue (1992, 480) cite the “currently poor
state of knowledge about...the process of local government decision making.” While
Hasler (1986) and Rich (1993) agree there is little available literature on intergovernmental aid allocation, Karski and Barth (2000, 46) cite both Hasler’s and Rich’s
work when stating their own analysis on child welfare allocation methods “had relatively
little to build on” due to “scant literature on traditional sub-state allocation.” In this way,
while research was lacking in 1986 and even into 1993, the situation has remained the
same into 2000.

Additionally, some researchers highlight that available literature may

be biased because it has tended to treat aid allocation within all states and localities the
same (Barnes 1993, Pelissero and Morgan 1992, Stein and Hamm 1987).
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3. Determinants of Intergovernmental Aid Allocation
Taken as a whole, the available literature on determinants of intergovernmental
aid allocation, while lacking in regards to set methods of aid distribution, does allow for
the identification of commonly used, as well as commonly overlooked, determinants.
While this identification is a compilation of numerous pieces of research, it nonetheless
highlights determinants that tend to be used by federal and state governments when
allocating funding to the local level. Certainly, this compilation is preliminary and basic.
Population and tax rates. Stein and Hamm (1994) highlight the tendency for state
aid to be received not by those localities with the greatest need, but by those with the
greatest populations and highest tax burdens. Noteworthy, this study suggests population
and tax rates have been common determinants used by states when finding that twentyeight states demonstrated this tendency. In 1977, 34 percent of states studied distributed
inter-governmental aid to local governments based on tax rates; dropping to 31 percent in
1982.

The authors attribute some credit for these targeting practices to the political

unpopularity of income redistributions to the poor. Similarly, Ebel (1991), studying county
spending patterns, found county governments tend to offer more financial assistance to
counties with the largest populations; not necessarily those demonstrating the greatest need.
Merget (1981) found that larger U.S. cities, regardless of the type of financial
assistance, tend to receive greater amounts of aid. While cities with populations greater
than one million received an average of $484.98 in intergovernmental aid per person, the
smallest cities received only $134.07 per person. Merget suggests using population as the
prime determinant of public spending overlooks needy and dependent groups such as
children, elderly and the impoverished who may not necessarily live in highly populated
areas. Plus, using population by itself overlooks the fact that even cities with the largest
populations do not conform to any clear pattern of fiscal and public needs.
Similarly, Copeland and Meier (1984) found that state population tends to be
positively related to the distribution of federal grants. Only 5% of the state to state
variation in federal grant funding could not be accounted for by population. Per capita
income, percent of families in poverty, tax effort, unemployment rates, urbanization and
12

age of infrastructure were not significant in explaining grant allocation. When these
variables were included in the analysis, they had no significant impact on the explanatory
power of population. The authors comment that congressional decisions have a history of
being based on population.
Due to problems with multicollinearity, this study does not include population
density. However, percent of individuals living in an urban area does helps account for
population density.
Metropolitan Status. Rich=s (1993) research on intergovernmental aid allocation
suggests a link between metropolitan status and population as determinants of aid
distribution. Locally managed suburban cities and urban municipalities demonstrated the
greatest degree of targeting to needy residents. Rich suggests that these areas are also
those with smaller and more manageable numbers of people. Conversely, targeting
efforts among the federal and state levels were the least likely to benefit local residents
with the greatest needs. Relating to population as a determinate of aid distribution, the
prospect of targeting becomes less likely at the federal and state levels because of the
greater numbers of needy recipients. The same situation is believed to be true for the
number of political jurisdictions within each level of government: the greater the number
of jurisdictions, the worse the record for targeting. Rich suggests this can be attributed,
in great part, to the need for a large, supportive legislature. The amount of funding
available for targeting to programs presents a similar situation, because it tends to be
easier to target to smaller programs.
Supporting Rich=s (1993) findings, Reeder (1996) and Stein and Hamm (1987)
suggest rural communities suffer when forced to compete for grants against urban
communities.

Many rural areas do not qualify for block grant assistance due to

inadequate tax bases, and therefore find themselves receiving insufficient amounts of aid.
While some research claims that rural areas have not benefited from intergovernmental aid allocation, other research states the same for urban areas. Dye and
Hurley (1978) aimed to measure the responsiveness of federal and state aid to the urban
needs of 243 cities found in the nation’s Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas as of 1970.
13

In all cities studied, total federal aid was unrelated to every measure of need except for
percent nonwhite and crime rate. In this way, federal aid was unrelated to population size,
age of the population, aging infrastructure, age of the city, percent of families below the
poverty level, median family income, public assistance rate, segregation and education.
State aid, on the other hand, was more closely related to urban needs; specifically
population size, growth and density, age of the city and segregation. However, these
differences were moderate. Overall, Dye and Hurley indicate in this research, and in a brief
response published in 1981, federal spending in urban areas tends to not be directed
towards those cities with the greatest needs.
Poverty rate and income. There is some discrepancy as to whether poverty rate
and issues of income are treated as important determinants in the allocation of aid to local
governments. Rich (1993) suggests the degree to which impoverished populations are
concentrated tends to be a significant factor in allocation. Rich found that suburban cities
receiving the most targeted aid were also those with one or more block groups comprised
of low to moderate-income persons. Thus, the extent to which local officials perceive an
area to be in need has an important bearing on the amount of aid targeted. In the case of
this study, a higher poverty rate translated into a greater amount of targeted aid to needy
persons. However, this finding conflicts with that of Copeland and Meier (1984) in
which percent of families in poverty was not a strong predictor of allocation.
Due to problems with multicollinearity, this study does not include per capita
income. However, percent of individuals below the poverty level does help account for
this factor.
4. Potential Non-Determinants of Intergovernmental Aid Allocation
Although previously mentioned, two studies draw attention to factors that tend to
remain unconsidered when determining aid allocation to local governments. These studies
are worth reiterating because of the types of factors in question. Keeping in mind the
purpose of intergovernmental aid, which is to lessen variances in the abilities of states and
localities to locally generate needed revenues (Downes and Pogue 1992, Stein and Hamm
14

1987, Copeland and Meier 1984) overlooking these determinants may harm needy
localities. Determinants overlooked indicate measures of need and help determine overall
quality of life.
First, when Copeland and Meier (1984) found state population, more than any other
factor included in their analysis, tended to be significantly and positively related to the
distribution of federal grants, their study took on important implications. Namely, per
capita income, percent of families in poverty, tax effort, unemployment rates, urbanization
and age of infrastructure were unable to account for federal aid allocation as powerfully as
population.
Second, Dye and Hurley (1978) measured the responsiveness of federal and state
aid to urban needs. In all cities studied, total federal aid was unrelated to every measure of
need except for percent nonwhite and crime rate. Federal aid, then, was unrelated to
population size, age of the population, aging infrastructure, age of the city, percent of
families below the poverty level, median family income, public assistance rate, segregation
and education. While state aid was more closely related to urban needs, specifically in
regards to population size, growth and density, age of the city and segregation, the
difference from federal aid was only moderate. Again, these factors are central to a
locality’s socioeconomic health and overall quality of life.
Complimenting these two studies, Schneider and Logan (1985) found that intergovernmental aid to suburbs in the mid-1970s tended to not be targeted to lower income
locations. While suburbs in general received a greater amount of intergovernmental aid
through the 1970s, the largest increases went to middle-income suburbs. Reeder (1996),
Yagi (1995), and Stein and Hamm (1994, 1987) agree that allocating aid based on factors
such as income overlooks local governments with the greatest socioeconomic needs.
5. Methods of Intergovernmental Aid Allocation
As highlighted by Dye and Hurley (1978) and Copeland and Meier (1984), factors
representing quality of life issues within the community level have tended to be overlooked
by states when allocating aid. This tendency is reinforced by taking into account allocation
methods, or practices, present within state redistribution. Determinants of aid within these
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methods compliment research suggesting wealth and population size are prime
determinants of state aid distribution to local governments.
Hasler (1986), focusing specifically on social service programs funded by the
Social Service Block Grant (formerly known as Title XX), gives needed attention to state
allocation methods. Hasler first gives an overview of the three most frequently used
methods of aid allocation to sub-state governments. These methods are the availability of
local funds, historical allocation, and caseload statistics. Availability of local funds, while
aiding jurisdictions, tends to assist only those most able to raise funds locally. More
wealthy and prosperous areas tend to benefit from this method, while areas with the
greatest need receive the least attention due to their inability to raise the necessary funds.
Historical allocation tends to support only those areas able to develop a significant demand
for a program and the resources to fund it. Areas with smaller populations, unable to meet
the quota for demand, do not receive sufficient aid. Caseload statistics allocates according
to the number of available cases. In this method, areas with smaller population are again
left without needed assistance.
Importantly, Hasler also gives attention to three other methods of allocation rarely,
if at all, used. These methods are indicators of need, demand for service, and program
performance. While indicators of need may allow for better targeting of aid, this method
goes unused due to its requirements. Namely, the target population and the best suiting
indicators of need must be identified. Demand for service, while having the potential to
better identify the extent of need for services, goes unused because it requires constantly
updated data. Program performance, requiring concise program objectives for successful
allocation, also remains unused. Hasler stresses that the necessities surrounding these
methods, the time and money they require, contribute to their rare use.
Similarly, McCready and Rahn (1986) highlight the debate over two specific
allocation methods for funding social service programs. These methods are fixed utility
and fixed budget. The fixed utility method of allocation aims to meet standards for social
well being, or problem alleviation, regardless of cost. The fixed budget method, on the
other hand, aims to keep costs to a minimum and focuses instead on expenditures. The
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fixed budget method, a traditional approach to funding, proves inadequate because it
focuses only on cost and overlooks standards for social well being and problem alleviation.
6. Potential Political Factors in Aid Allocation
McCready and Rahn (1986) suggest that comparing the fixed budget and fixed
utility methods of aid allocation highlights the competing value preferences of local
officials, agency administrators, social workers, and residents in need. Local officials may
decide that certain social problems are too expensive to deal with because only marginal
benefits may result from a significant amount of funding. Helping alleviate other needs
with a higher value per dollar, then, is a frequent outcome. Although this analysis will be
unable to test for competing value preferences, a potential determinant of aid allocation, it
is important to give attention to research suggesting that political factors may account for at
least some variation in aid allocation.
Copeland and Meier (1984) found that population was by far the most significant,
explanatory factor in accounting for aid allocation.

However, the authors note that

population by itself cannot account for all of the variance in allocation. Political factors are
credited and may help account for the variance that population cannot.
Relating, Yagi (1995) holds that politicians and government officials are often
characterized with shortsightedness in making allocation decisions. Choices made often
center on short-term policy results, regardless of the degree to which the decisions truly aid
those most in need. Additionally, an information gap is present between local government
officials and state and federal officials.

Yagi credits this gap as contributing to the

allocation of resources to areas with new, attractive projects and not those needing the
money for public services or maintenance. This trend corresponds with Pelissero and
Morgan (1992, 986) in their research on the “law of political dispersion” within federal and
state funding to public schools. Meaning, local officials may broadly distribute funding to
better ensure their future reelections. However, significant targeting to the poor becomes
lost because they are not considered politically important. Similarly, federal and state aid
to public schools was found to be influenced mainly by enrollment, and not significantly
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targeted to districts with children from impoverished families and lower per capita
incomes.
Just as Pelissero and Morgan (1992) highlighted the tendency to spread benefits
widely in order to ensure political support, Rich (1993) focuses on this point in research on
the CDBG program. This study gives attention to the wide variation in willingness and
ability of governments to target aid to the poor. Officials at federal, state and local levels
alike have demonstrated the tendency to allocate funding widely; in the process not
targeting aid to those with the greatest need. Targeting to those places, neighborhoods and
people most in need was found to have declined over the course of the CDBG program. A
more prominent federal role, however, usually meant a greater degree of targeting to the
poor.
Overall, Rich (1993) found redirecting program responsibility from the federal
government to the sates, such as through block grants, has not brought about a greater
degree of responsiveness. Targeting attempts to small communities were less responsive
and benefits varied widely under state initiatives in a majority of states. Within only a few
states did targeting actually increase when allocated with state-led initiatives. CDBG
funding was commonly spread well outside the ranges of those areas with the greatest need,
as well as those that had previously received HUD aid. Furthermore, decisions made by
local officials on the types of activities to receive funding led to a distribution of aid which
exceeded the locations of individuals with low to moderate incomes. Rich suggests it is not
unusual for governments to spread aid widely. Targeting varies both across and within the
levels of government, while also varying according to the type of decision making system,
or formula, in use.
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH PROCEDURES
1. Data and Methods
Data for this study are drawn from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of
Labor Statistics: County Statistics. In all, 683 counties are included; 300 counties from the
Northern states of Pennsylvania, New York, Michigan and Ohio, and 383 counties from the
Southern states of Mississippi, Louisiana, Alabama, Arkansas, and Tennessee. Financial
data for each county represent amounts from all local governments. In this way, the term
local government represents county governments and any municipality, township, school
district and special district within the county.
The purpose of this research is to examine the sensitivity of state intergovernmental
aid per capita to measures of resources, infrastructure, social services, social problems and
demographics in Northern and Southern local governments, in 1982 and 1992. In order to
test these questions, ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple linear regression analysis is used
to regress independent variables on state aid per capita to local governments in the North
and South, in 1982 and 1992.
The dependent variable in this study is intergovernmental aid from state
government, represented in per capita figures.
The independent measures for this analysis represent measures of local government
resources, infrastructure, social services, social problems and demographics. Representing
resources, this analysis includes property value (in natural log form), per capita total tax
rate, and percent of persons with a college degree or more. Representing infrastructure,
this analysis includes percent of persons living in housing built in 1949 and prior.
Representing the condition of the social services, or what Posner and Wrightson (1996)
terms the social safety net, this study includes percent of individuals receiving
Supplemental Security Income benefits and percent of individuals receiving Social Security
benefits. Percent of individuals age 65 and older was not included in this analysis because
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percent of individuals receiving Social Security generally represents the same population.
Representing social problems, this analysis includes crime rate, percent of families below
the poverty level and percent of unemployed individuals.

Lastly, representing

demographics, this study includes percent of individuals living in an urban area, percent of
children aged 5 to 17 and percent of non-white individuals. Property value is represented
in natural log form due to the variable’s skew in its original form. Transforming it greatly
improves the normality of its distribution.
2. Variable Definitions And Building
Definitions of variables in this analysis are gathered from the U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Labor Statistics (Co-Stat 4 1992).
College plus: College Plus for 1980 and 1990 represent persons age 25 and over
completing 4 years or more of college. To express these variables in per capita
terms, the original values were divided by the populations for the appropriate years,
then multiplied by 100 to form percentages.
Crime rate: Crime statistics for 1979 and 1989 represent the number of serious crimes
known to police for that year. Serious crimes include violent crimes (murder and
non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault) and
property crimes (burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft). To express this
variable in per capita terms, the original values were divided by the populations for
1980 and 1990 respectively, then multiplied by 100 to form percentages.
Families below poverty level: Families in poverty during 1979 and 1989 are classified as
below poverty level by comparing total income to the poverty threshold. This
threshold varies according to the size of family and the age of the head of
household. Poverty status is also determined for persons who are not members of a
family; excluding inmates, Armed Forces members living in barracks, college
students in dormitories, and unrelated persons under age 15. To express these
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variables in per capita terms, the original values were divided by the populations for
1980 and 1990 respectively, then multiplied by 100 to form percentages.
Minor: Minor for 1980 and 1990 represent children age 5 to 14, 15, 16 and 17. Age is
classified as age at last birthday. To express these variables in per capita terms, the
number of all children age 5 to 14, 15, 16, and 17, for 1980 and 1990 respectively,
were first added together. These values were divided by the populations for the
appropriate years, then multiplied by 100 to form percentages.
Non-white population: Nonwhite population during 1980 and 1990 is comprised of Black,
Asian and Pacific Islander, Hispanic, American Indian, Eskimo and Aleut, and
Other. Race is based on a person’s self-identification, and does not represent a
specific scientific or biological definition. Black population includes persons who
did not classify themselves as Black, but instead entered Black Puerto Rican,
Haitian, Jamaican, Nigerian or West Indian. Asian and Pacific Islander includes
those who indicated Japanese, Chinese, Filipino, Korean, Asian Indian,
Vietnamese, Hawaiian, Guamanian and Samoan.

Hispanic includes Mexican,

Puerto Rican, Cuban and other Hispanic. American Indian, Eskimo and Aleut
include those who did not indicate a specific race but instead reported the name of
an Indian tribe. Persons of Other race include all races not given a specific
category. To express these variables in per capita terms, the number of all
minorities, for 1980 and 1990 respectively, were first added together. These values
were divided by the populations for the appropriate years, then multiplied by 100 to
form percentages.
Older housing: Older housing for 1980 and 1990 represent year-round housing built 1949
to 1940 and 1939 or earlier. A housing unit is a house, apartment, mobile home,
trailer, group of rooms or single room used as a separate living space (i.e., those
spaces in which occupants do not live or eat with others in the building, and those
in which occupants have access to the outside through a shared hall). Year built
refers to when the building was first constructed, not remodeled. To make this
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variable, number of persons living in housing built 1949 to 1940 and 1939 or earlier
were first added, for 1980 and 1990 respectively. These variables were expressed
in per capita terms by dividing these values by the populations for the appropriate
years, then multiplying by 100 to form percentages.
Property value: Property value for 1980 and 1990, expressed in natural log terms,
represents the respondent’s estimate of what the house and property would sell for.
Statistics are for one-family houses, on less than 10 acres, with no business on the
property. This variable was transformed into natural log form due to its severe
skew.
Social Security recipients: Social Security benefits recipients during 1980 and 1990, in per
capita terms, represents persons age 65 and older eligible for full-retirement
benefits. Persons 62 and older, eligible for reduced benefits, is included. Data also
includes special-age 72 benefits, representing men age 72 before 1972 and women
age 72 before 1970 who do not quality for retired worker benefits. These variables
were expressed in per capita terms by dividing these values by the populations for
the appropriate years, then multiplying by 100 to form percentages.
SSI recipients: Supplemental Security Income (SSI), for 1980 and 1990, in per capita
terms, provides cash assistance for persons with limited income and resources who
are aged (65 and older), blind or disabled (unable to take part in a gainful
occupation due to medical, physical or mental handicap). Money received from
SSI is that which, when combined with the person’s gross income, will raise total
monthly income to the Federal benefit rate. These variables were expressed in per
capita terms by dividing these values by the populations for the appropriate years,
then multiplying by 100 to form percentages.
State aid to local government: Intergovernmental aid from state government for 1982 and
1992, in per capita figures, represent amounts fiscal aid received from the Federal
and state government. This excludes amounts received from other governments
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through sale of property, commodities and utilities. All intergovernmental revenue
is treated as general revenue. Intergovernmental revenue from the state is all aid
received from the state government, including aid channeled through the state level
but originally from the Federal Government. To express these figures in per capita
terms, values were divided by the populations for the appropriate years, then
multiplied by 1000 to form percentages.
Total tax: Total tax for 1982 and 1992, per capita, represent amounts received from all
government taxes. Total tax includes: (1) Property taxes based on ownership and
value of property, taxes on property as a whole, real and personal, tangible or
intangible. (2) Sales and gross receipts taxes based on volume or value of goods
and services, gross receipts or gross income, and the use, storage, production or
importation of goods. These variables were expressed in per capita terms by
dividing these values by the populations for the appropriate years, then multiplying
by 100 to form percentages.
Unemployed: The unemployed civilian labor force during 1979 and 1989, in per capita
figures, represent civilians age 16 and over who were not at work, those with a job
but not at work, and those available and looking for work during the previous four
weeks. Additionally, those not working but waiting to be called back from a layoff
are included. These variables were expressed in per capita terms by dividing these
values by the populations for 1980 and 1990, respectively, then multiplying by 100
to form percentages.
Urban: Urban status during 1980 and 1990, in per capita figures, represents persons living
in urbanized areas and places outside of urban areas with populations of 2,500 of
more. Urbanized areas are defined as concentrations of 50,000 persons or more.
These variables were expressed in per capita terms by dividing these values by the
populations for the appropriate years, then multiplying by 100 to form percentages.
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3. Research Aims
This analysis is not intended to argue that state intergovernmental aid per capita
should be positively related with every measure of need, or that state aid per capita should
be negatively associated with all measures of resources. In other words, taking into
account the numerous programs and services funded through state intergovernmental aid, it
is not expected that state aid per capita will be consistently redistributed to local
governments with greater signs of socioeconomic hardship.

The review of literature

demonstrates that this is not the case. Instead, this analysis is intended to examine the
relationship of state aid per capita to measures of resources, infrastructure, social services,
social problems and demographics in Northern and Southern local governments in 1982
and 1992. In effect, the extent to which state aid per capita is sensitive to local government
needs is under examination.
Specifically, this study aims to test the following:
1) To what extent are state aid figures per capita correlated with measures of need within
local governments? In other words, to what extent are state aid figures per capita
positively correlated with percent of individuals living in older housing, percent
receiving AFDC, SSI and Social Security, crime, percent below poverty and percent
unemployed?
2) To what extent are state aid figures per capita redistributional in character, or negatively
correlated with measure of resources? In other words, to what extent are state aid
figures per capita negatively correlated with property value, total tax per capita, per
capita income and percent with a college degree or more?
3) Do state aid figures per capita differ according to time-period? That is, what effects
may new federalism have on the distribution of state aid per capita from 1982 to 1992?
4) Do state aid figures per capita differ according to region? That is, are there any
significant differences in state aid distribution per capita among Northern and Southern
local governments? This question tests traditional frostbelt/sunbelt characterizations.
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
1. Multiple Regression Models
This analysis contains four separate models; each testing the extent to which local
government resources, infrastructure, social services, social problems and demographics
results in state aid per capita. Each analysis is properly specified, or normally distributed.
Standard residuals show that all means equal zero and all standard deviations approximate
one.
The general model of the extent to which local governments in the North, in 1982,
received state intergovernmental aid per capita is seen as:
ŷ = 3051.159 (Constant) - 273.645 (Property Value: ln) + 5.621 (Total Tax Per
Capita) + 7.556 (Percent Old House) + 0 (Crime Rate) + 0 (Percent College Plus) +
0 (Percent Minor) - 3.429 (Percent Non-White) + 86.981 (Percent SSI) – 771.157
(Percent Unemployed) + 0 (Percent Below Poverty) – 19.882 (Percent Social
Security) + .951 (Percent Urban)
The general model of the extent to which local governments in the South, in 1982,
received state intergovernmental aid per capita is seen as:
ŷ = 793.400 (Constant) – 80.39 (Property Value: ln) + 3.856 (Total Tax Per Capita)
+ 0 (Percent Old House) + 0 (Crime Rate) + 0 (Percent College Plus) + 12.835
(Percent Minor) + 1.465 (Percent Non-White) + 15.513 (Percent SSI) + 460.42
(Percent Unemployed) + 0 (Percent Below Poverty) + 0 (Percent Social Security) +
0 (Percent Urban)
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The general model of the extent to which local governments in the North, in 1992,
received state intergovernmental aid per capita is seen as:
ŷ = 2466.05 (Constant) –273.645 (Property Value: ln) + 4.389 (Total Tax Per
Capita) + 14.431 (Percent Old House) + 25.08 (Crime Rate) –20.887 (Percent
College Plus) + 0 (Percent Minor) – 4.318 (Percent Non-White) + 138.956 (Percent
SSI) - 1015.691 (Percent Unemployed) + 0 (Percent Below Poverty) - 29.596
(Percent Social Security) + 0 (Percent Urban)
The general model of the extent to which local governments in the South, in 1992,
received state intergovernmental aid per capita is seen as:
ŷ = 4362.824 (Constant) – 401.575 (Property Value: ln) + 1.965 (Total Tax Per
Capita) – 12.099 (Percent Old House) + 0 (Crime) + 0 (Percent College Plus) +
21.826 (Percent Minor) + 1.786 (Percent Non-White) + 0 (Percent SSI) – 520.981
(Percent Unemployed) + 0 (Percent Below Poverty) + 0 (Percent Social Security) +
0 (Percent Urban)
2. Findings
Tables 1 through 4 show the means, standard deviations and ranges for all
independent variables in each of the four models. The f statistics for these analyses show
that the alternative hypotheses cannot be accepted. The independent variables in each
analysis are significantly related to state aid per capita. The strength of this statement,
however, differs according to time-period and region. Tables 5 through 8 present the OLS
multiple regression coefficients for the four models. The independent variables in these
regression analyses show that state aid per capita, as a whole and according to categories,
differs according to both region and time-period. In the North in 1982, the independent
variables account for 66.1% of the variance in per capita state aid, while in 1992 they
account for 68.1%. In the South in 1982, the independent variables account for 48.2% of
the variance in aid, while in 1992 they account for only 46.6%. This shows that the
independent variables consistently account for more variation in state aid per capita in the
North than the South.
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College plus
In 1982, the effects of percent of individuals with a college degree or more,
controlling for all other independent variables, is insignificant in both the North and South.
In 1992, the effects of percent of individuals with a college degree or more changed
in the North. Percent with a college degree is now negatively associated with state aid per
capita. For each one percent increase in college-educated individuals, there is a $20.887
decrease in state aid. The Beta2 of .060 tells that 6 percent of the variance in state aid per
capita to Northern local governments is explained by college educated individuals. In the
South, percent with a college degree or more remains insignificant.
Crime
In 1982, crime rate is insignificant in both the North and South, controlling for all
other independent variables.
In 1992, crime rate is positively related to state aid per capita in the North. Each
one-unit increase in crime increases state aid per capita by $25.08. The Beta2 of .027 tells
that 2.7 percent of the variance in state aid per capita to Northern local governments is
explained by crime rate. In the South, however, crime rate remains insignificant.
Families below poverty level
In 1982, the effect of percent of families below the poverty level on state aid per
capita is not significant in the North or South, controlling for all other independent
variables. This situation remains true for 1992 as well.
Minors
The effects of percent of minors in the North and South in 1982 differs regionally,
controlling for all other independent variables. While percent of minors is insignificant in
the North, it is positively related to state aid per capita in the South. Each one-percent
increase in percent minors yields, on average, a $12.84 increase in state aid per capita. The
Beta2 of .060 tells that 6 percent of the variance in state aid per capita to Southern local
governments is explained by percent of minors.
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In 1992, this situation remains the same.

While percent of minors is again

insignificant in the North, it is positively related to state aid per capita in the South. Each
one-percent increase in percent of minors accounts for a $21.83 increase in state aid. The
Beta2 of .094 tells that 9.4 percent of the variance in state aid per capita to Southern local
governments is explained by percent of minors, controlling for all other independent
variables.
Non-white population
In 1982, the effects of percent of non-white individuals differs according to region,
controlling for all other independent variables.

In the North, percent non-white is

negatively related to state aid per capita. Each one-percent increase in percent non-white
yields a $3.43 decrease in state aid. The Beta2 of .023 tells that 2.3 percent of the variance
in state aid per capita to Northern local governments is explained by percent non-white. In
the South however, each one-percent increase in percent non-white yields a $1.47 increase
in state aid per capita. The Beta2 of .064 tells that 6.4 percent of the variance in state aid
per capita is explained by percent non-white.
This situation remains the same in 1992. In the North, percent non-white is still
negatively related to state aid per capita. For each one-percent increase in percent nonwhite, there is a $4.318 decrease in aid. The Beta2 of .018 tells that 1.8 percent of the
variance in state aid per capita is explained by percent non-white. In the South, each onepercent increase in percent non-white yields a $1.79 increase in state aid per capita. The
Beta2 of .044 tells that 4.4 percent of the variance in state aid per capita to Southern local
governments is explained by percent non-white, controlling for all other independent
variables.
Older housing
In 1982, the effects of percent of individuals living in older housing on state aid per
capita, controlling for all other independent variables, differs regionally. In the North,
percent living in older housing is positively related to state aid per capita. Each onepercent increase in percent living in older housing increases state aid per capita by $7.56.
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The Beta2 of .067 tells that 6.7 percent of the variation in aid to Northern local
governments is explained by percent living in older housing. In the South however,
percent living in older housing is not a significant factor.
This situation changed in 1992. Percent living in older housing is a significant
factor in both the North and South, controlling for all other independent variables.
However, the directions of the relationships differ. In the North, each one-percent increase
in percent living in older housing yields a $14.43 increase state aid per capita. The Beta2
of .092 shows that 9.2 percent of the variance in state aid to Northern local governments is
explained by percent living in older housing. In the South, each one percent living in older
housing decreases state aid per capita by $12.10. The Beta2 of .024 tells that 2.4 percent of
the variance in per capita state aid to Southern local governments is explained by percent
living in older housing.
Property value (ln)
In 1982, the effects of property value on state aid per capita, controlling for all other
independent variables, is negatively in both the North and South. In the North, each onepercent increase in property value yields a $273.65 decrease in state aid. The Beta2 of .109
tells that 10.9 percent of the variation in aid to local governments is explained by property
value. In the South, each one-percent increase in property value yields a $80.39 decrease in
state aid. The Beta2 of .026 tells that 2.6 percent of the variation in state aid per capita to
Southern local governments in explained by property value.
This situation remains the same in 1992. In the North, controlling for all other
independent variables, each one-percent increase in property value yields a $175.96
decrease in state aid. The Beta2 of .042 tells that 4.2 percent of the variance to Northern
local governments is explained by property value. In the South, each one-percent increase
in property value yields a $401.58 decrease in aid. The Beta2 of .276 tells that property
value explains 27.6 percent of the variation in state aid to Southern local governments in
1992.
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Social Security recipients
In 1982, the effects of percent of individuals receiving Social Security on state aid
per capita, controlling for all other independent variables, differs regionally. In the
North, percent of Social Security recipients negatively affects aid. For each one-percent
increase in persons receiving Social Security, there is a $19.88 decrease in state aid per
capita. The Beta2 of .185 tells that 18.5 percent of the variance in state aid is explained by
percent receiving Social Security. In the South however, percent receiving Social Security
is not significant.
In 1992, this situation remains the same. In the North, each one-percent increase in
individuals receiving Social Security yields a $29.60 decrease in state aid per capita. The
Beta2 of .143 tells that 14.3 percent of the variance in aid to Northern local governments is
explained by percent receiving Social Security. In the South, however, percent receiving
Social Security remains insignificant.
SSI recipients
In 1982, percent of individuals receiving SSI, controlling for all other variables, has
a positive relationship in both Northern and Southern local governments. In the North, for
each one-percent increase in percent receiving SSI, there is a $86.98 increase in state aid
per capita. The Beta2 of .102 tells that percent receiving SSI explains 10.2 percent of the
variance in aid to local governments in the North. In the South, for each one-percent
increase in percent receiving SSI, there is a $15.51 increase in aid. The Beta2 of ..064 tells
that 6.4 percent of the variance in state aid per capita to Southern local governments is
explained by percent receiving SSI.
In 1992, this situation changed somewhat. Percent of individuals receiving SSI is
still significant and positive in the North.

For each one-percent increase in percent

receiving SSI, there is a $138.96 increase in aid. The Beta2 of .099 tells that 9.9 percent of
the variance in state aid per capita to Northern local governments is explained by percent
receiving SSI. However, percent receiving SSI is no longer a significant factor in the
South, controlling for all other independent variables.
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Total tax
In 1982, the effect of per capita total tax on state aid per capita is positive in both
Northern and Southern local governments, controlling for all other independent variables.
In the North, each one-percent increase in per capita total tax increases state aid by $5.62.
The Beta2 of .50 tells that per capita total tax explains 50 percent of the variance in state
aid. In the South, each one-percent increase in per capita total tax increases aid by $3.86.
The Beta2 of .112 shows that 11.2 percent of the variance in state aid to local governments
in the South is explained by per capita total tax.
In 1992, this situation remained the same, controlling for all other independent
variables. In the North, each one-percent increase in per capita total tax increases aid by
$4.39. The Beta2 of .442 tells that 44.2 percent of the variance in state aid per capita to
local governments is explained by per capita total tax. In the South, each one-percent
increase in per capita total tax increases aid by $1.97. The Beta2 of .043 shows that 4.3
percent of the variance in aid to local governments in the South is explained by per capita
total tax.
Unemployed
In 1982, the effects of percent unemployed on state aid per capita, controlling for all
other independent variables, differs regionally.

In the North, percent unemployed is

negatively related to aid. For each one-percent increase in percent unemployed, there is a
$771.16 decrease in state aid per capita. The Beta2 of .042 tells that 4.2 percent of the
variance in aid is explained by percent unemployed. In the South however, percent
unemployed has a positive effect on state aid per capita. Each one-percent increase in
percent unemployed yields a $460.42 increase in state aid. The Beta2 of .018 tells that 1.8
percent of the variance in state aid per capita to Southern local governments is explained by
percent unemployed.
This situation changed in 1992. For, percent unemployed in both the North and
South demonstrates a significant, negative relationship with state aid per capita, controlling
for all other independent variables. In the North, each one-percent increase in percent
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unemployed decreases aid by $1015.69. The Beta2 of .024 tells that 2.4 percent of the
variance in state aid per capita is explained by percent unemployed. In the South, each
one-percent increase in percent unemployed decreases state aid by $520.98. The Beta2 of
.025 shows that 2.5 percent of the variance in aid is explained by percent unemployed.
Urban
In 1982, the effects of percent urban on state aid per capita, controlling for all other
independent variables, differs regionally. In the North, percent urban is positively related
to state aid. For each one-percent increase in percent urban, state aid increases by $.95.
The Beta2 of .017 tells that 1.7 percent of the variation in state aid per capita is explained
by percent urban. In the South however, percent urban is not significantly related.
In 1992, this situation changed. Controlling for all other independent variables,
percent urban is no longer significantly related to state aid per capita in either the North or
the South.
3. Accounting For Multicollinearity
Multicollinearity in regression analyses develops when two or more independent
variables are highly correlated; leading to less precision in the effects of the independent
variables on the dependent. The higher the correlation between independent variables, the
more serious the milticollinearity (Schroeder, Sjoquist and Stephan 1986). Taking into
account socioeconomic variables are naturally highly correlated, this study does show signs
of multicollinearity.

The degree to which it is present, however, is the important

consideration. To best determine the degree of multicollinearity, the variance inflation
factors (VIFs) and correlations were paid particularly close attention.
The original model for these four analyses included percent receiving AFDC,
population density and per capita income.

However, these three variables proved

problematic; making potentially significant variables insignificant. Additionally, the VIFs
and correlations for these variables showed severe signs of multicollinearity. Removing
these variables improved the significance of some variables, and especially improved the
VIFs and correlations.
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In the revised model however, percent below the poverty level is consistently
insignificant in all models, while showing high VIFs and correlations across region and
time-period. This is especially true for the South in 1982 and 1992. The question became
whether this variable is truly insignificant in explaining state aid allocation per capita, or
whether its insignificance is due to multicollinearity. Due to the importance of including
percent below the poverty level in the analyses, an additional step was taken to try to
account for the high multicollinearity. Namely, percent receiving SSI, having the highest
correlations with percent below poverty (greater than .8), was taken out of the models for
Southern local governments. If percent below the poverty level had become significant
after doing so, this would have meant the insignificance is due to multicollinearity.
However, taking percent receiving SSI out of the models did nothing to alter the
insignificance of percent below poverty. In this way, percent SSI was kept in the models,
and percent below poverty level remains insignificant but included in the models.
4. Discussion of Findings
Again, this analysis is not intended to argue that per capita state intergovernmental
aid should be positively related with every measure of need, or negatively associated with
all measures of resources. In other words, due to the numerous directions that state
intergovernmental aid is channeled, it is not expected that state aid per capita will be
consistently redistributed to local governments with greater signs of socioeconomic
hardship. The review of literature demonstrates that this is not the case. Instead, this
analysis is intended to examine the relationship of state aid per capita to measures of
resources, infrastructure, social services, social problems and demographics in Northern
and Southern local governments in 1982 and 1992. In effect, the extent to which state aid
per capita is sensitive to local government needs and resources under examination.
Regression coefficients
Tables 5 through 8 present relationships between state aid per capita and measures
of local government resources, infrastructure, social services, social problems and
demographics. For ease of comparison, Table 9 is a composite of Tables 5 through 8. A
blank space indicates that the regression coefficients were not significantly related to state
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aid per capita.

These multiple regression analyses test the extent to which local

government resources, infrastructure, social services, social problems and demographics
result in state aid per capita.
Despite the regional differences highlights by the regression coefficients, the r2
values do highlight an important consistency.

Across time-periods, the independent

variables account for a greater proportion of state aid per capita to the North than the South.
Again, factors not present within this analysis may account for per capita aid in the South.
Domestic policy changes and political factors not able to be controlled for in this analysis
may be partly to explain.
Resources
In 1982, measures of resources in both Northern and Southern local governments
demonstrated some tendency towards redistribution; channeling aid to those areas with the
least amount of resources.

In the North, areas with higher property values received

significantly less state aid per capita, on average, controlling for all other independent
variables. Areas with higher total taxes did receive more state aid per capita, but the
amount is less that moderate. This situation describes the South as well, but the amount of
redistribution signified by property value is less powerful.
In 1992, this situation reversed. The South now shows more efforts towards
channeling state aid to areas with lower levels of resources. However, it is important to
note that only property value is redistributive; leaving total tax per capita and percent of
college educated individuals unfavorable in regards to channeling state aid to local
governments with the lowest levels of resources.
Infrastructure
There is a distinct regional difference regarding the redistributive effects of percent
of individuals living in older housing on state aid per capita. In the North in both 1982 and
1992, percent living in older housing accounts for a slight increase in state aid per capita.
While this figure for Northern local governments is less than moderate, Southern local
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governments show no signs of redistribution. In fact, percent living in older housing in
Southern local governments in 1992 accounts for a decrease in state aid per capita.
Social Services
Only percent of individuals receiving SSI shows signs of redistribution of state aid
per capita to local governments with the greatest needs.

However, this statement is

significant, or strong, only in the North in 1992. While Southern local governments in
1982 do demonstrate some efforts towards redistribution, the amount is not strong.
Furthermore, percent of individuals receiving Social Security accounts for a decrease in
state aid per capita in Northern local governments in 1982 and 1992, while remaining
insignificant in the South in both time-periods.
Social Problems
Measures of social problems do not show strong signs of redistribution of state aid
per capita to local governments with the greatest needs. The only exception is the South in
1982, in which local governments with higher levels of unemployed persons received
significantly more state aid per capita, controlling for all independent variables. However,
other than this exception, state aid per capita is harmed by the presence of higher numbers
of unemployed; while percent of families below the poverty level and crime rate remain
largely insignificant to state aid received.
Demographics
There is a distinct regional difference in regards to measures of demographics.
While percent of minors accounts for a slight increase in state aid per capita to Southern
local governments in both time-periods, the effect is insignificant in the North. Similarly,
while percent non-white accounts for a very small increase in state aid in the South in both
time-periods, the effects are negative in the North. Percent living in an urban setting is
largely insignificant in both regions.
Summary of aid distribution
Table 9 summarizes the distribution of state aid per capita to Northern and Southern
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local governments in 1982 and 1992. In short, redistribution efforts to local governments
with high levels of need and low levels of resources are not particularly good in either the
North or South, regardless of time-period. Only property value (ln) as a measure of
resources is able to account for redistribution of state aid on a per capita basis. However,
even this measure is not consistent across region and time. As for infrastructure, Northern
local governments have allocated greater amounts of state aid per capita, in both 1982 and
1992, to areas with higher percentages of persons living in older housing. However, these
amounts are not significant. As for the social services, percent of individuals receiving SSI
does show some promising redistribution efforts; accounting for more state aid per capita in
the North in 1982 and 1992, and in the South in 1982. However, percent unemployed
offers little favorable view of state aid redistribution; especially in the North. An already
significant lack of state aid per capita according to percent unemployed in Northern local
governments in 1982 decreased further in 1992.
In all, the argument can be made that efforts towards redistribution according to
measures of needs and resources in Northern and Southern local governments, in 1982 and
1992, are not strong. It is important to allow for the fact that total state aid to local
governments, per capita, is a measure that combines many different types and uses of aid.
However, this study takes an overall look at the efforts to redistribute state aid to local
governments with the greatest levels of needs and lowest levels of resources. In general,
redistribution is not strong.
This study, compared to previous research
Six findings within this research agree with those of previous research. First, Stein
and Hamm (1994) find that localities with the highest tax burdens tend to receive the most
state aid. This study agrees, although the amount received is not particularly significant.
Second, Dye and Hurley (1978) note that poverty rate has not consistently been a strong
predictor of state aid.

This study agrees in that across region and time percent of

individuals below the poverty level is insignificant.

Noteworthy though, this study

disagrees with Rich’s (1993) finding that cities with significant low income populations
have, at times, received the most aid. Third, Dye and Hurley (1978) find that indicators of
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aged populations were not significant factors in state aid distribution. Indeed, this study
finds a negative relationship between state aid per capita and percent receiving Social
Security in the North in both 1982 and 1992. Noteworthy though, this study disagrees with
Mullins and Rosenstraub’s (1992) finding a significant and positive relationship between
the proportion of the population 65 and older and expenditures towards retirees. Fourth,
while Dye and Hurley (1978) did not find a significant relationship between areas with a
higher proportion of minority residents and state aid received, this study agrees. Although
percent non-white accounts for an increase in state aid per capita in Southern local
governments in 1982 and 1992, the amounts are not strong. Fifth, Dye and Hurley (1978)
find that age of city and infrastructure was only moderately related to state aid. This study
agrees in that percent of individuals living in older housing, when positive, is only slightly
redistributive in state aid allocation. Sixth, this study agree with Dye and Hurley’s (1978)
finding that education level insignificant in explaining state aid allocation.
Two findings within this research disagree with those of previous research. First,
while Copeland and Meier (1984) find unemployment rate is insignificant in explaining
state aid allocation, this study generally finds a prominent decrease in state aid per capita
according to percent unemployed. Second, Dye and Hurley (1978) find that crime is
significantly and positively related to total state aid. This study generally finds crime rate
insignificant in accounting for state aid allocation per capita.
Study limitations
Again, this study is not able to measure certain issues that help inform, or give
context to, state aid allocation to local governments. To recap, the first of these is the
domestic policies of new federalism in which both state and federal funding for many of
the social services was reduced or eliminated. Conlan (1998), Cole, Taebel and Hissong
(1990), Liebschutz and Taddiken (1986) and Nathan and Doolittle (1985) give in-depth
information on this shift in domestic policy which resulted in less available
intergovernmental aid to those areas most in need.
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Second, the responses of local government officials to aid reductions cannot be
measured in this analysis. Morgan and Hirlinger (1993), Cole and Taebel (1994) and
Nathan and Doolittle (1985) agree that local officials tended to cut funding to social
services in order to divert funds to other areas deemed more politically important. These
areas tend to be highways, airports and mass transit systems. This demonstrates the
detachable nature of many social services. Cole, Taebel and Hissong (1990), Peterson
(1986), Cole and Taebel (1984) and Nathan and Doolittle (1984) agree that reductions in
federal and state aid to local governments did not necessarily harm local governments
themselves. Many reductions in funding tended to correspond with political attitudes.
Specifically, many of the social services received less funding instead of taxes being raised
to compensate for need. In short, many social services tended to be viewed by local
officials as only marginal when compared to other service responsibilities.
Lastly, this study cannot measure trends found within the post-Reagan
administrations. King (1999), Conlan (1998), Posner and Wrightson (1996) and Beckman
(1995) agree that the mistreatment of the social services within new federalism policies of
the Reagan administration continued into later administrations. In other words, many of
the social services continue to struggle for needed funding in light of budget restrictions.
Comparing state aid amounts for Northern and Southern local governments in 1982
and 1992, as a whole, it is evident that factors not included in this analysis are important.
First, independent variables included in these regression analyses account for more state aid
per capita to Northern local governments than Southern in both 1982 and 1992.
Specifically, r2 values show that the independent variables in the North in 1982 explain
66.1% of the variance in aid, and 68.1 percent of variance in 1992. In the South however,
only 48.2% of the variance in 1982 and 46.6% in 1992 is explained by the independent
variables.
Future study
The need for continued research into state aid allocation to local governments is
strong. Corresponding with previous research, this analysis supports the claim that state
spending towards local governments is, in large part, unrelated to measures of local
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government needs and resources. In other words, this research lends support to the idea
that state spending in local governments is not directed towards those with the greatest
needs. Additionally, this research contradicts traditional frostbelt/sunbelt characterizations.
Prior to the full effects of the policy changes, Cole and Taebel (1983) found that local
government officials from the Sunbelt were more in favor of new federalism’s policy
changes than those from the Frostbelt. While officials from the North perceived having to
reduce services, make layoffs and raise property taxes in order to compensate for declining
state aid, officials from the South did not foresee having to make such severe actions. This
research, however, finds that Northern and Southern states tend to be unwilling, or unable,
to redistribute state aid per capita to local governments with the highest levels of needs and
lowest levels of resources.
In order for a more complete study on state aid allocation per capita to local
governments, a future study would do well to account for the limitations that this study
cannot. For example, only indirectly can this study take into account the effects of new
federalism by using the 1982 and 1992 time periods; 1982 pre-dates effects of new
federalism and 1992 is after the fact. While not able to be controlled for, these limitations
do provide context in which this analysis takes place. Consequently, only inferences can
be made on the effects new federalism, local government officials’ responses to declining
aid, detachable programs and the post-Reagan administrations have on state aid per capita.
A study controlling for these other factors, possibly through qualitative research gathering
from local government officials, may produce significantly different results.
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APPENDIX

Table 1. Mean, S.D. and Total N of Variables for Northern States, 1982
Variable Name
Percent College Plus
Crime
Percent
Below
Poverty
Percent Minor
Percent Non-White
Percent Old House
Property Value (ln)
Percent
Social
Security
Percent SSI
State Aid Per Capita
(Dependent Variable)
Total Tax Per Capita
Percent Unemployed
Percent Urban

Mean
6.78
3.59
10.77

S.D.
2.86
2.20
3.51

Description
Continuous (range: 2.94% – 23.55%)
Continuous (range: .00 - 27.88)
Continuous (range: 4.00% – 26.98%)

21.82
5.77
17.93
10.50
17.22

1.94
8.98
6.89
.2437
4.35

Continuous (range: 12.89% – 27.15%)
Continuous (range: .40% – 86.51%)
Continuous (range: 5.29% – 69.59%)
Continuous (range: 9.57 – 11.44)
Continuous (range: 7.15% – 40.60%)

1.44
379.58

.7392
201.18

Continuous (range: .28% – 5.44%)
Continuous (range: $.00 – $2812.51)

42.23
.026
40.95

25.32
.053
27.44

Continuous (range: $.00 – $358.86)
Continuous (range: .00% - .69%)
Continuous (range: .00% – 100.00%)

Note: Total N for all variables = 300
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Table 2. Mean, S.D. and Total N of Variables for Southern States, 1982
Variable Name
Percent College Plus
Percent Crime
Percent Below Poverty
Percent Minor
Percent Non-White
Percent Old House
Property Value (ln)
Social Security
Percent SSI
State Aid Per Capita
(Dependent Variable)
Total Tax Per Capita
Percent Unemployed
Percent Urban

Mean
5.09
1.98
21.89
22.93
24.32
7.58
10.25
18.20
4.54
345.19

S.D.
2.03
1.59
7.87
2.20
19.89
2.00
.2320
3.88
1.87
115.40

Description
Continuous (range: 1.60% - 13.89%)
Continuous (range: .00 – 9.41)
Continuous (range: 8.31% - 52.71%)
Continuous (range: 15.23% - 30.46%)
Continuous (range: .62% - 86.25%)
Continuous (range: 2.44% -19.61%)
Continuous (range: 9.67 - 11.16)
Continuous (range: 8.33% - 35.86%)
Continuous (range: .91% - 10.59%)
Continuous (range: $167.10 – $1187.77)

17.96
.038
33.97

10.02
.034
24.42

Continuous (range: $5.82 – $77.16)
Continuous (range: .00% - .22%)
Continuous (range: .00% - 99.91%)

Note: Total N for all variables = 383
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Table 3. Mean, S.D. and Total N of Variables for Northern States, 1992

Variable Name
Percent College Plus
Percent Crime
Percent
Below
Poverty
Percent Minor
Percent Non-White
Percent Old House
Property Value (ln)
Percent
Social
Security
Percent SSI
State Aid Per Capita
(Dependent Variable)
Total Tax Per Capita
Percent Unemployed
Percent Urban

Mean
8.94
2.96
12.25

S.D.
4.10
2.29
4.69

Description
Continuous (range: 3.03% - 31.08%)
Continuous (range: .00 – 31.01)
Continuous (range: 3.51% - 28.14%)

18.80
7.31
17.66
10.96
18.35

1.83
10.76
7.40
.4072
4.48

Continuous (range: 11.31% - 25.06%)
Continuous (range: .51% - 107.73%)
Continuous (range: 5.12% - 80.31%)
Continuous (range: 9.86 – 13.10)
Continuous (range: 8.70% - 38.80%)

1.64
711.02

.7978
350.80

Continuous (range: .37% - 6.59%)
Continuous (range: $.00 - $5229.73)

79.41
.0232
40.80

53.16
.0532
27.81

Continuous (range: $.00 - $750.38)
Continuous (range: .00% - .77%)
Continuous (range: .00% - 100.00%)

Note: Total N for all variables = 300
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Table 4. Mean, S.D. and Total N of Variables for Southern States, 1992
Variable Name
Percent College Plus
Percent Crime
Percent Below Poverty
Percent Minor
Percent Non-White
Percent Old House
Property Value (ln)
Percent Social Security
Percent SSI
State Aid Per Capita
(Dependent Variable)
Total Tax Per Capita
Percent Unemployed
Percent Urban

Mean
6.63
2.08
22.74
20.35
24.54
7.58
10.66
19.01
4.32
614.48

S.D.
2.89
2.11
8.52
2.42
20.14
2.21
.2252
3.93
1.86
172.26

Description
Continuous (range: 2.36% - 21.83%)
Continuous (range: .00 – 11.98)
Continuous (range: 5.71% - 56.31%)
Continuous (range: 14.57% - 28.16%)
Continuous (range: .42% - 86.80%)
Continuous (range: 1.94% - 22.00%)
Continuous (range: 10.10 – 11.78)
Continuous (range: 7.70% - 37.03%)
Continuous (range: .86% - 11.10%)
Continuous (range: $124.87 - $2091.35)

36.05
.0449
33.87

18.12
.0520
25.08

Continuous (range: $9.61 - $147.01)
Continuous (range: .00% - .73%)
Continuous (range: .00% - 99.96%)

Note: Total N for all variables = 383
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Table 5. OLS Multiple Regression Coefficients for Northern States, 1982

Independent Variables
Y Intercept (Constant)
Resources
Property Value
Total Tax Per Capita
Percent College Plus
Infrastructure
Percent Old House
Social Services
Percent SSI
Percent Social Security
Social Problems
Crime Rate
Percent Below Poverty
Percent Unemployed
Demographics
Percent Minor
Percent Non-White
Percent Urban

Coefficient Value (Slope)
3051.16*

Beta
-----

Beta2
-----

-273.645*
5.621*
-----

-.331
.707
-----

.109
.50
-----

7.556*

.259

.067

86.981*
-19.882*

.320
-.430

.102
.185

---------771.157*

---------.205

--------.042

-----3.429*
.951*

-----.153
.130

----.023
.017

Note: N = 300
r2 = .661
*p < .05
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Table 6. OLS Multiple Regression Coefficients for Southern States, 1982

Independent Variables
Y Intercept (Constant)
Resources
Property Value (ln)
Total Tax Per Capita
Percent College Plus
Infrastructure
Percent Old House
Social Services
Percent SSI
Percent Social Security
Social Problems
Crime Rate
Percent Below Poverty
Percent Unemployed
Demographics
Percent Minor
Percent Non-White
Percent Urban

Coefficient Value (Slope)
793.40

Beta
-----

Beta2
-----

-80.39*
3.856*
-----

-.162
.335
-----

.026
.112
-----

-----

-----

-----

15.513*
-----

.252
-----

.064
-----

--------460.42*

--------.134

--------.018

12.835*
1.465*
-----

.245
.253
-----

.060
.064
-----

Note: N = 383
r2 = .482
*p < .05
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Table 7. OLS Multiple Regression Coefficients for Northern States, 1992

Independent Variables
Y Intercept (Constant)
Resources
Property Value (ln)
Total Tax Per Capita
Percent College Plus
Infrastructure
Percent Old House
Social Services
Percent SSI
Percent Social Security
Social Problems
Crime Rate
Percent Below Poverty
Percent Unemployed
Demographics
Percent Minor
Percent Non-White
Percent Urban

Coefficient Value (Slope)
2466.05*

Beta
-----

Beta2
-----

-175.961*
4.389*
-20.887*

-.204
.665
-.244

.042
.442
.060

14.431*

.304

.092

138.956*
-29.596*

.316
-.378

.099
.143

25.08*
-----1015.691*

.164
-----.154

.027
----.024

-----4.318*
-----

-----.132
-----

----.018
-----

Note: N = 300
r2 = .681
*p < .05
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Table 8. OLS Multiple Regression Coefficients for Southern States, 1992
Independent Variables
Y Intercept (Constant)
Resources
Property Value (ln)
Total Tax Per Capita
Percent College Plus
Infrastructure
Percent Old House
Social Services
Percent SSI
Percent Social Security
Social Problems
Crime Rate
Percent Below Poverty
Percent Unemployed
Demographics
Percent Minor
Percent Non-White
Percent Urban

Coefficient Value (Slope)
4362.82*

Beta
-----

Beta2
-----

-401.575*
1.965*
-----

-.525
.207
-----

.276
.043
-----

-12.099*

-.156

.024

---------

---------

---------

---------520.981*

---------.157

--------.025

21.826*
1.786*
-----

.306
.209
-----

.094
.044
-----

Note: N = 383
r2 = .466
* p < .05
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Table 9. Composite OLS Multiple Regression Coefficients

Independent Variables
Resources
Property Value (ln)
Total Tax Per Capita
Percent College Plus
Infrastructure
Percent Old House
Social Services
Percent SSI
Percent Social Security
Social Problems
Crime Rate
Percent Below Poverty
Percent Unemployed
Demographics
Percent Minor
Percent Non-White
Percent Urban
r2

North

South

1982

1992

1982

1992

-273.645
5.621
-----

-175.961
4.389
-20.887

-80.39
3.856
-----

-401.575
1.965
-----

7.556

14.431

-----

-12.099

86.981
-19.882

138.956
-29.596

15.513
-----

---------

---------771.157

25.08
-----1015.691

--------460.42

---------520.981

-----3.429
.951
.661

-----4.318
----.681

12.835
1.465
----.482

21.826
1.786
----.466

Note: For all values listed, p < .05
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INDEX
Determinants of aid:
AFDC, 10-11
college education, 21, 26, 27
income, 20, 21, 22
non-white, 21, 27, 28
older housing, 21, 28, 28-29
population density, 18-19, 21, 22
poverty, 27
property value, 28, 29
Social Security, 28, 30
SSI, 29, 30
tax, 18-19, 29, 31
unemployment, 21, 31-32
urban, 19-20, 21, 29, 32
Federal block grants:
history of, 9-11
purpose of, 9-11
Frostbelt/Sunbelt:
characterization of, 1
Intergovernmental aid allocation:
and detachable programs, 6
decline of, 3-8
Intergovernmental aid:

determinants of, (see
Determinants of aid)
history of, 9-11

crime, 21, 26, 34
methods of, 15-17
and new federalism, 4-5
non-determinants, 14-15
previous research into, 10-18
poverty,
political factors in, 17-18
reductions in, 9-10
targeting of, 10-11
New federalism:
and declining aid, 4-5
purpose of, 4
and Reagan administration, 6-7
Quality of life:
and block grants, 2
and aid targeting, 2-3
Socioeconomic status:
resources, 34
infrastructure, 34-35
social services, 35
social problems, 35
demographics, 35

allocation of (see Intergovernmental aid allocation)
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Adam D. Baus
2094 University Drive, Lemont Furnace, PA 15456
(724) 439-4838 adam_baus@hotmail.com
OBJECTIVE
Seeking a position that will utilize a thorough background in sociology, research methods
and skills, data collection, analysis and interpretation.
EDUCATION
West Virginia University
Applied Social Research: Graduate Program

QPA: 3.83
Graduation May2002

Saint Vincent College
Sociology: Undergraduate Education

QPA: 3.82
Graduated May 2000

EMPLOYMENT
Sociology Department Employee: Research Assistant
West Virginia University: Morgantown, WV
· Research U.S. Census data in order to update existing data sets
· Construct comparative graphs and tables
· Considerable use of Microsoft Office

August 2001 - Present

Sociology Department Employee: Teaching Assistant
August 2000 - August 2001
West Virginia University: Morgantown, WV
· Instructed students and provided in-class assistance during weekly archaeology labs
· Constructed archaeological dig-site with fellow students
· Proctored exams, graded exams and papers, gave weekly make-up exams
· Organized and updated records
· Maintained regular office hours for students with questions or in need of assistance
Sociology Department Employee: Teacher’s Assistant
August 1998 - May 2000
Saint Vincent College, Latrobe, PA
· Graded exams and papers; proctored make-up exams
· Organized and updated records
· Maintained regular office hours for students with questions or in need of assistance
Teacher’s Assistant: Intern
May 1999 - August 1999
Fayette County Community Action Agency: Uniontown, PA
· Co-taught GED, adult learning and family development classes
· Responsible for administering tests, grading short essays and homework
· Assisted in directing students towards proper social service resources
54

Computer User Consultant
August 1996 - May 1998
Saint Vincent College, Latrobe, PA
· Provided assistance to students and faculty
· Provided general maintenance and upkeep within computer labs
· Received and filed questions raised by students and faculty. Recorded steps taken to in
solving problems
Service Desk and Lay-away Attendant
May 1998 - August 1998, Dec.1998- Jan.1999
Ames Department Store, Connellsville, PA
· Granted refunds, processed lay-away items
· Provided customer assistance, answered incoming telephone calls and in-store inquiries
SKILLS
Computer Skills: Microsoft Office (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Access), WordPerfect
Office (WordPerfect, Quattro Pro, Paradox), Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
(SPSS) (Versions 8 – 10), Internet
Human Service Skills: Interpersonal, Communication, Organizational, Problem solving,
Clerical, Time management
HONORS
·
·
·
·
·
·
·

Recipient two year assistantship (WVU)
Recipient three year academic scholarship (SVC)
Recipient four year athletic scholarship (SVC)
SVC Dean's List (8 semesters)/Alpha Chi
Stone & Company scholarship (SVC)
Graduated SVC with Highest Honors
Academic Excellence in Sociology (SVC)
ACTIVITIES

·
·
·
·

SVC Sociology Club / Philosophy Club
SVC Cross Country Team
Habitat for Humanity Volunteer
”Adopt-a-Grandparent” coordinator
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REFERENCES
Dr. F. Carson Mencken
Chairperson/Professor: Sociology Dept.
West Virginia University
307 Knapp Hall
Morgantown, WV 26506
(304) 293-5801 (ext.3212)
Prof. Patricia Rice
Chairperson/Professor: Anthropology Dept.
West Virginia University
307 Knapp Hall
Morgantown, WV 26506
(304) 293-5801 (ext. 3213)
Dr. Phyllis Riddle
Chairperson/Professor: Sociology Dept.
Saint Vincent College
300 Fraser Purchase Road,
Latrobe, PA 15650
(724) 532-6600
Dr. Thad Coreno
Professor: Sociology Dept.
Saint Vincent College
300 Fraser Purchase Road,
Latrobe, PA 15650
(724) 532-6600
Dr. George Leiner
Professor: Philosophy Dept.
Saint Vincent College
300 Fraser Purchase Road,
Latrobe, PA 15650
(724) 532-6600
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